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ARTICLES
COORDINATING EXTENSIVE TRADEMARK
RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
KEXIN L'
ABSTRACT
A trademark can be not only a word or logo, but also a color, sound,
three-dimensional object, and many other nontraditional items.
Corporations are increasingly seeking nontraditional trademark protection
instead of or in addition to traditional patents and/or copyrights. They are
also enforcing both traditional and nontraditional marks more aggressively
and in ways that may lead to significant foreclosure effects. This working
paper argues that these trends may raise serious competition policy
concerns that should play an important role in the evolution of trademark
law. For instance, trademark registration and enforcement should be subject
to the same antitrust constraints as other "ordinary" kinds of business
conduct.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights provide different degrees of exclusivity to
their owners by law. Antitrust scholars are often skeptical about these
rights.' For a long time, their skepticism has concentrated on patents and
copyrights. Patent and copyright protections are conferred by the Patent and
Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution. 2 As the Supreme Court
stated in 1953:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted
to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with
services rendered.
Society grants authors and inventors exclusive rights in their works for
a limited period of time. These rights unavoidably suppress competition in
exchange for public benefits from the efforts of those innovators "to
' See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David Levine, The Case Against Intellectual Property,
92(2) Am. EcoN. REV. (Papers and Proceedings) 209-12 (2002).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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introduce novel ideas and knowledge into the public domain." It is difficult
to coordinate antitrust law and intellectual property law largely because it is
difficult to strike a sound balance between competition and innovation.
Yet, patents and copyrights are not the whole story of intellectual
property. There is another important category of intellectual property:
trademarks. Unlike patents and copyrights, trademark protection derives
from the same constitutional basis as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
("Sherman Act"): the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.5
The traditional function of trademarks is "to identify the origin or
ownership of the goods to which it is affixed." 6 Trademarks can reduce
consumers' search cost and protect them from being confused by similar
but inferior products.7 Without apparent conflicting values, 8 it therefore
seems at first glance that trademark law and antitrust law should provide a
coherent legal regime on business competition.
4 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990). However, even
the temporary monopolies authorized by the Patent and Copyright Clause may be
challenged. The United States now is reconsidering the patent system: is granting such
monopoly the best way to encourage innovation that in turn will benefit public most? For
example, Bernard Sanders has recently introduced a bill proposing to replace the current
patent system for AIDS drugs with a prize system so that generic versions of new drugs can
reach the market more quickly and patients can buy new drugs at lower price. It is a more
trademark-like system because it requires proof of actual success before any award can be
given. The downside of this idea is: without some temporary monopoly, how can the
innovator recoup its investment and have enough resource to finance the marketing before
the new product can be proved successful and receive the prize? See Brian Vastag, 'Radical'
Bill Seeks to Reduce Cost of AIDS Drugs by Awarding Prizes Instead of Patents, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/radical-bill-seeks-to-reduce-cost-of-aids-drugs-by-awarding-prizes-instead-of-
patents/2012/05/19/gIQAEGfabU story_ I.html.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; The USPTO: Who We Are, http://www.uspto.gov/ (last
modified June 10, 2013).
6 Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813, 813-14 (1926) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412
(1916)).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (quoting 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2] (3d
ed. 1994)).
Some less visible conflicting values may exist. For example, it is at least arguable
that with trademark protection, mark owners may have more incentive to promote and
produce their goods, which is similar to the "encouraging innovation" function that patents
and copyrights serve. Kexin Li, Where Is the Right Balance? -- Exploring the Current
Regulations on Nontraditional Three-Dimensional Trademark Registration in the United
States, the European Union, Japan and China, 30 No. 2 WiS. INT'L L. J. 428, 438 (2012).
9 For example, antitrust misuse defense is frequently asserted in patent and copyright
infringement context. See, e.g., Lasercomb America, 911 F.2d at 970. However, a court
observed "the forces favoring exercise of such power in a trademark suit are much weaker
than those calling for its exercise in patent litigation." Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). It attributed the distinction to:
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However, two emerging trends may overturn that conclusion. First,
the scope of trademarkable matter has been expanding. For example,
traditionally, a manufacturer might want to register its product shape or
packaging as a design patent. But now more and more companies are
seeking three-dimensional trademark registrations and have been
successful. 10 It is thus difficult to say that the grant of nontraditional
trademarks is not a lawful monopoly rewarded for innovation, considering
the fact that the mark may be potentially patentable as well.
Second, trademark enforcement has become more aggressive. It is
now often an important part of a company's branding strategy. A
company's branding strategy not only may include words, logos (which can
be traditional trademarks), shape and packaging (which can be
nontraditional trademarks), but also may include advertising, marketing and
the like in the stream of commerce (which can be more than trademarks)."
However, as two scholars have discovered, both trademark and antitrust law
"are giving corporate mark holders broad and increasing competitive brand
power without either an explicit public policy debate or a conscious attempt
to craft an appropriate legal regime to manage brands." 12 As a result,
trademark enforcement, especially by owners of famous marks, often
becomes an effort to preserve brands even absent consumer confusion. For
example, a women's shoe designer owning a famous mark on a red outsole
may try to enjoin every competitor from using the color of that red in the
outsole of their high heels, even if few consumers would confuse the two
designers when seeing the shoes. The potential exclusionary effect must be
addressed by carefully crafted competition policies.
This working paper will look into this dilemma between modern
trademark practice and competition policy in detail. Having derived from
the fact that a patent represents a grant of a limited monopoly that in
most instances would, absent its legalization by Congress, constitute an
unlawful restraint of trade. The limited monopoly is granted in exchange
for disclosure of the patented invention to the public so that it may be
utilized in free competition upon expiration of the patent. A valid
trademark, on the other hand, merely enables the owner to bar others
from use of the mark, as distinguished from competitive manufacture and
sale of identical goods bearing another mark, or even no mark at all,
since the purpose of trademark enforcement is to avoid public confusion
that might result from imitation or similar unfair competitive practices
rather than to authorize restraints upon trade.
Id. (emphasis added).
10 Li, supra note 8, at 164.
" Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU
L. REv. 1425, 1498 (2010).
12 d
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the Commerce Clause, their goals should, in theory, be coherent. Part II will
provide a general introduction to trademark law and an economic analysis
of trademarks, brands and their impact on competition. In the next part, the
paper will examine the expanding scope of trademarkable subject matter. It
will discuss why corporations not only register words and logos on their
products but also pursue trademark protection for colors, sounds, and three-
dimensional shapes and packaging they use as parts of their products, and
why corporations turn to trademarks in addition to patents and/or copyrights
when they try to secure an advantageous position for their products. This
paper will also address the impact on competition brought by these new
trends.
Next, this paper will use case law to illustrate the interaction between
trademark law and competition policy in the current regulatory regime. The
competition issues raised in the three cases show the difficulty in finding a
balance between protecting legitimate trademarks and facilitating healthy
market competition. Finally in Part IV, this paper will suggest a more
effective regulatory framework that ensures that trademark law and
competition policy, including antitrust law, operate together coherently to
protect consumers, regulate business competition and facilitate interstate
commerce.
II. TRADEMARKS IN GENERAL AND A BRIEF ECONOMIc ANALYSIS
A. Introduction to Trademarks
Trademarks are a type of intellectual property. According to the
Lanham Act, a mark can consist of "any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof." 13 Additionally, a mark should be used "to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown."' 4 It is easy to find what is a word
mark 5 or a two-dimensional logo (a traditional "symbol") mark 6 merely by
picking up any branded product nearby and reading its package. But what is
a symbol? What is a device? What is "any combination thereof'? A
reasonable person might conclude this language potentially can embrace a
great number of things. In fact, it does. The Supreme Court declared
unequivocally in 1995 that "[t]he language of the Lanham Act describes the
" 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
14 d
For example, the word "Nike" on the sneakers manufactured by Nike. Wal-Mart
Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
16 One example is Nike's famous "swoosh" symbol. Id.
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universe of things that can qualify as a trademark in the broadest of
terms." '" Five years later, the Court again implicitly upheld the broad
reading by many courts of appeals to include product design into "trade
dress," which is trademarkable but "originally included only the packaging,
or 'dressing,' of a product."' 8 In short, almost everything can become a
trademark if it identifies and distinguishes a particular source of product
(but not the product itself).' 9 Trademarks protect producer goodwill (the
goodwill of the source of product) rather than product goodwill (the
goodwill of the product itself).
Trademarks originated centuries ago "when craftsmen reproduced
their signatures, or 'marks,' on their artistic or utilitarian products" so that
consumers could identify the products as being made by them. 20
Trademarks are protected by both statutory and common law in the U.S. 2 1
Modem U.S. trademark protection stems from the Commerce Clause in the
22United States Constitution. A law deriving from the Commerce Clause
should be intended to facilitate interstate commerce.23 In short, although no
one would doubt that trademarks are intellectual property, trademark
protection is designed to facilitate interstate commerce. 24 This goal at the
minimum arguably includes protecting market competition. The Sherman
Act is also based on the Commerce Clause. 25 Sharing the same ultimate
goal, at least theoretically, federal trademark protection and federal antitrust
laws should consistently and coherently facilitate interstate trade and
commerce, but in reality there are still many problems.
Admittedly, trademark protection unavoidably has at least some
exclusionary impact on the market. A federal registered mark owner can
17 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
" Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209.
19 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163.
20 Trademarks, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/trademarks.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
21 Frequently Asked Questions about Trademarks, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426712 (last visited June 10,
2013).
22 "[The Congress shall have Power t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.23 d
24 In contrast, as previously noted, patent and copyright protections are conferred by
the Patent and Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution. It grants Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. A patent or copyright grants its owner a monopoly over his or
her works to reward and encourage innovation. In contrast, as argued below, a trademark
grants its owner a limited exclusive right to use it: to identify and distinguish the owner's
product.
25 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).
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exclude others from using the same mark or similar marks that will confuse
consumers. 26 However, this should not be an absolute traditional property
right to exclude or exclusivity of limited terms as granted to patent and
copyright owners. Instead, it should be carefully enforced and narrowly
tailored to the federal trademark law's policy goals-
[to] reduce[] the customer's costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions' . . . [, to] assure a producer that it (and not
an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-
related rewards associated with a desirable product . . .2 [,]
thereby [to] 'encourage[] the production of quality products,'27
. and simultaneously [to] discourage[] those who hope to sell
inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability
quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.28
Therefore, federal trademark registration should not create exclusivity
similar to patents or copyrights. It is now well-settled law that "[i]t is the
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by
granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a
limited time . . ,29 The Court also cautioned in Qualitex that granting
patent-like trademark rights may confer "a monopoly [that] could be
obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be
extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity)."3 0
A trademark is an important category of intellectual property, but it is
distinguishable from patents or copyrights. Although the scope of
trademarkable subject matter is broad, the scope of the exclusive right is
much more limited. The right to exclude should be closely related to the
source-identifying function of trademarks. So, for competition concerns, it
is appropriate to view trademarks as no more than a normal creature in the
stream of commerce, rather than monopoly-granting intellectual property
rights entitled to substantial immunity from antitrust oversight.
B. A BriefEconomic Analysis on Trademarks and Competition
As emphasized above, a trademark is used to identify and distinguish
the product bearing it. The primary economic value of trademarks should
26 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
27 Please note the language used by the Court here. Trademark protection is used to
encourage "production," while patent and copyright protections are designed to encourage
"innovation." These two concepts are inherently different.
28 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64.
29 Id. at 164.
o ld. at 164-65.
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thus be in source identification in differentiated good markets. A trademark
can differentiate an otherwise generic good if the buyer cares about or can
be induced to care about the source, which contrasts with patent and
copyright serving to reward and facilitate innovation or creativity with
limited term exclusivity. From the differentiation of the product arises the
interplay of monopolistic and competitive forces. 3' Tyson's branded
chicken is a good example of a commodity that was marketed as something
special through a strategy of trademarking.
Traditionally, as laid out in a famous economics text by Edward
Chamberlin, the value of trademarked goods was explained in terms of
equilibrium between demand and supply over a field much wider than the
market the mark owner actually controlled. 3 2 It was because while patents
were understood to provide exclusivity, often accompanied by substantial
market power, trademarks were "more often looked upon as conferring a
lesser degree of individuality of a product." 3 3 This should remain so now,
despite the ongoing efforts of enforcing trademark rights in the same way as
enforcing patent and copyright rights.
A trademark has both monopoly and competitive natures in it. On one
hand, trademarks can be seen as "general welfare monopolies."34 A mark
can mark off the goods of one manufacturer, and thereby lift its products a
little above the dead level of competition. 35 Of course, for many well-
known brands like Coca-Cola or Nike, the upward shift might generate
huge demand.36 Generally each mark is unique in the sense that no others
can use it in a way that may cause confusion among consumers. As
products are differentiated by different marks, buyers are given a basis for
preference, and will therefore be paired with sellers in accordance with
these preferences.37 These preferences may to some extent render sellers a
38
certain level of control over supply and price.
On the other hand, trademarks cannot be pure monopolies. If a mark is
used to distinguish one product from products generally, there are likely to
be other products. As long as there are others, there cannot be absolute
domination.39 Also, even if there are alternatives, there is no comparable
economic goal in eliminating them as long as the buyer can distinguish the
3 EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A
RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 56 (8th ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1965).32 Id. at 57.
33id
34 Id. at 59.
35 Id. at 60.
3 6 Id. at 62.
3 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 32, at 65.
381 Id. at 66.
39 Id. at 6 1.
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trademarked product from them. Moreover, a seller's control conferred by
his ownership of a mark over supply and price is limited, because his
control over supply is only partial and he may be facing a highly elastic
demand curve and many available substitutes manufactured by his
competitors. 40 For instance, a consumer having a preference for Coca-Cola
will surely choose Coke instead of Pepsi if both are sold for $1.00. He
might still pick up a bottle of Coke if its price is $1.50 while Pepsi is sold
for $1.00. But what if Coke is sold for $3.00 while Pepsi is still marked as
$1.00, given the fact that Pepsi is also a famous mark indicating good
quality?
The limited monopolistic aspect of trademarks can be tolerated, if
their use is closely tied to the narrow function of product differentiation.
Trademarks and brands are commonly regarded in the business world as
means of facilitating more efficient competition because the competitors
compete on the merits - consumer recognition and consequently loyalty.4 '
There are transactional economies by having good source identification so
that customers do not waste search time. Even in a nearly perfect
competitive market, driven by the goal of profit maximization, a reasonable
market participant will still try to make his product distinguished from and
(though this may not always be the case) better than competitors' products
to attract more customers and survive the competition. If products in the
same market do differ in some way, there may be no need to redirect
genuine consumer preference on certain products (and willingness to pay
more for them).42
Although to a large extent these explanations seem still valid, they are
mere theories. They are based upon the assumption that trademarks are
carefully crafted to serve the product differentiation function and limited
"quasi-monopolies" - they serve to reward innovation with limited-term
40 Id. at 66.
41 Id at 60.
42 People should respect genuine consumer choices. A rational consumer may be able
to obtain sufficient information. If after weighing all the information he or she still chooses
one product over another although objectively the product chosen may not be as good as the
other. This choice is rational (in contrast to a signal of diminished capacity) and
manufacturers are actually fighting to win such preferences using different branding tools.
For example, many consumers claim that they can distinguish the tastes between Coca-Cola
and Pepsi and they prefer the taste of Coca-Cola. However, a blind tasting marketing
promotion for tens of years by Pepsi, the Pepsi Challenge, showed a consensus that Pepsi
was preferred by more Americans and many people mistook the taste of Pepsi for Coke.
Mary E. Woolfolk, William Castellan & Charles I. Brooks, Pepsi Versus Coke: Labels, Not
Tastes, Prevail, PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 52, 185-86 (Feb. 1983). Arguably, price
differences may reflect current consumer choice. And another interesting question may arise:
if it becomes very difficult to affect consumer preference or loyalty about one product by
reducing the price of a substitute, will the two products eventually be deemed in two separate
markets?
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right to exclude). However, in reality, trademarks are often mentioned
together with patents and copyrights as the most typical intellectual
property rights. One of the most attractive features is that they have the
potential to become incontestable and remain valid indefinitely. 43
Additionally, they have significant yet unclear overlap with the broad but
vague idea of brands, and current antitrust law and competition policy are
not paying close enough attention to marks and brands. It is thus
understandable why modem corporations (especially well-known ones with
strong consumer recognition and loyalty) try to enforce trademark rights
vigorously, expand their use of marks as if they are patents or copyrights,
and seek trademark protection actively in addition to their existing (or even
expired) patents and/or copyrights.
III. THE EXPANSION OF TRADEMARKS: FROM TRADITIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO NONTRADITIONAL TRADEMARKS
According to the USPTO, a trademark is also a brand name.4 As
previously discussed, it can be "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof."4 5 Many companies see trademarks as an important
tool to preserve their brands. Modem trademark rights have become more
and more expansive, and mark owners are more vigorously enforcing their
rights. Traditionally non-trademarkable items can now be trademarked, and
traditionally patentable or copyrightable items can be trademarked as well.
This opens the door to the durable exclusionary potential of using expansive
trademarks to exclude competition.
A. From Traditional Trademarks to Nontraditional Trademarks
As discussed above, a trademark can be any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof. Although the scope of trademarkable
subject matter seems very broad, when talking about trademarks people
generally will only refer to words and logos. For example, Coca-Cola
Company has the stylized word "Coca-Cola" 46 on its bottles as a trademark.
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006). In contrast, theoretically the most notable feature
should be source-identifying. However, especially with respect to the nontraditional
trademarks, the importance of this feature may be declining. For example, Coca-Cola has
both trademarks on the stylized word "Coca-Cola" and its glass bottle. See infra notes 46-47
and accompanying text. But when you go to buy a bottle of Coca-Cola, why are you able to
pick up a bottle of Coke instead of a bottle of Pepsi or Dr. Pepper? Will you identify it by the
word "Coca-Cola" on it, or by the fact that its bottle is different from Pepsi or Dr. Pepper's?
" Trademarks Home, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov
/trademarks/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
45 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
46 COCA-COLA, Registration No. 022,406 (filed Jan. 31, 1893).
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This is a traditional item for which corporations always would like to seek
trademark protection. However, can you imagine that the glass Coke bottle
is also Coca-Cola Company's trademark? 47
It might be surprising that in fact nontraditional 48 marks have existed
for a long time. Many decades ago, in addition to the famous Coke bottle, a
sound of NBC's three chimes, 4 9 and a scent of plumeria blossoms on
sewing thread had already been registered as federal trademarks.o But the
idea of nontraditional trademarks did not receive very much attention until
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Products Co. in 1995.51 In addition to declaring a green-gold color as
trademarkable, the Court held that a trademark might be "almost anything at
all that is capable of carrying meaning."5 2 At present, not only is Qualitex's
green-gold color a federal trademark,53 but Tiffany's blue jewelry boxes54
and bags55 also received trademark registrations. The Coke bottle is still a
valid mark,5 6 and Kenzo's beautiful fragrance bottles also passed the PTO's
examination. 5 NBC still has exclusive rights over its distinctive three
chimes.58 However, Motorola failed to secure trademark protection for its
ringtone due to the lack of distinctiveness. 59 Nonetheless, the overall trend
seems to be that the scope of trademarkable subject matter is expanding.
That means more and more elements embodied in one product may receive
47 COCA-COLA, Registration No. 696,147. See also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod.
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
48 Nontraditional marks mean marks that may not fall within common sense. Usually
ordinary people may only see words and logos as trademarks.
4' THE MUSICAL NOTES G, E, C, PLAYED ON CHIMES, Registration No.
916,522.
5o See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B. 1990). See also Qualitex, 514
U.S. at 162.
51 See generally Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159. Prior to this decision, there were only 93
nontraditional trademarks on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)'s record.
Kenneth L. Port, On Nontraditional Trademarks, 38 N. Ky. L. REv. 1, 2 (2011).
Nonetheless, until 2011, there had been 688 nontraditional trademark applications. Id. at 3.
52 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
53 Registration No. 1,633,711.
54 Registration No. 2,359,351.
ss Registration No. 2,416,795.
56 COCA-COLA, Registration No. 696,147.
57 KENZO, Registration No. 3,910,262. KENZO, Registration No. 3,933,848.
KENZO, Registration No. 3,919,070.
" THE MARK COMPRISES THE MUSICAL NOTES G, E, C, PLAYED ON
CHIMES, Registration No. 916,522.
59Nextel Commc'ns. Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1393, 1407 (2009). The
PTO crafted its new rule on sound mark registration in the Vertex Group case, that "[w]hen a
sound is proposed for registration as a mark on the Principal Register, for goods that make
the sound in their normal course of operation, registration is available only on a showing of
acquired distinctiveness." In re Vertex Group LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1694, 1700 (2009).
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trademark protection and the manufacturer can thereby exclude its
competitors from adopting the same or similar elements to avoid consumer
confusion. Such exclusion can lead to barriers to entry and foreclosure of
competition, as competitors have to seek alternative compatible elements,
which may be more costly and/or less effective. For example, granting
trademark registration to a popular red sole used in women's high fashion
shoes may be improper, since it may hinder competition by preventing
other designers from using the same color (which is essential to fashion
designs) in the soles of their shoes. Its main function may not be source-
identifying. Instead it may be advancing expressive, ornamental and
aesthetic purposes. 60 And competitors may be free to share such functional
features.
B. From Patents and Copyrights to Nontraditional Trademarks
As patents and copyrights are facing increasing skepticism and
scrutiny, as well as having only limited duration, a reasonable
businessperson would probably like to try to discover another intellectual
property right to enjoy a safer and more durable lawful monopoly.
A trademark can be a symbol or device,6 1 which can embrace "almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning." 62 Therefore, patentable
and/or copyrightable subject matter can potentially be trademarks despite
the possible first impression that it may be difficult. Corporations have
gradually turned to nontraditional trademarks and the Lanham Act to seek
substitutive protection. A few of those efforts have failed, but many have
succeeded.
Currently, the Supreme Court is quite skeptical about any effort to
secure a trademark registration after the utility patent on the same item has
expired. In a landmark trademark case, Traffix Devices v. Marketing
Displays, Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) tried to extend its exclusive
rights on its dual-spring design of a stand mechanism after the utility patent
expired. 6 3 It sued TrafFix, which copied the design after the utility patent's
expiration and used it in its own products, for trade dress infringement.6 4
As Qualitex's broad holding indicated, a design or packaging is
undoubtedly trademarkable. 65 However, also relying on Qualitex's
language that a functional feature was one "the exclusive use of [which]
60 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451
(2011).
61 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
62 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
63 Tra/Fix Devices v. Mktg. Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 25-26 (2001).
Id. at 26.6 1Id. at 28.
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would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage,"
the Court declared that the trademark protection could not be claimed for
functional product features,66and an expired utility patent added "great
weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional
until proven otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection."67 This
is a very heavy burden.
However, design patents and trademarks may coexist. Only a few
courts have spoken on this issue since Traffix. In E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v.
Prof'1 Prod. Research Co., plaintiff E-Z Bowz had one live utility patent
and two live design patents in a bow making machine. 68 It sued defendant
Professional Product Research for trade dress infringement by making a
similar machine.69 The court found that, although some parts of the trade
dress were functional and therefore not trademarkable, other parts were
purely arbitrary and were designed to help customers distinguish plaintiffs
machine from its competitors. 70 For that reason, the court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs trade dress
claims.7'
Interestingly, in this case when trying to support the position that its
trade dress was not functional, 72 E-Z Bowz presented evidence that "at least
36 different bow making machines exist that utilize dress different from the
E-Z Bowz bow maker."73 The court found that "the existence of these other
trade dresses shows that E-Z Bowz's trade dress does not inhibit or prevent
companies from entering this market and helps to prevent a finding of
functionality." 74 And a finding of functionality means that the trade dress
protection would "deprive competitors of alternative designs, and, thus,
foreclose competition from the relevant market."7 5 In contrast, the court
noted that the existence of a design patent was relevant evidence against
functionality.76
Copyrights and trademarks can also jointly provide protection for a
single item. Mickey Mouse and all other Disney characters are protected not
66 Id. at 32 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
67 Id. at 29-30.
68 E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof'1 Prod. Research Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15364, at
*3-*4 (2003).
6 Id. at *1.
70 Id. at *73-*74.
' Id. at *74.
72 To be registered, a trademark shall not be functional. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006).
7 E-Z Bowz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15364 at *70.
74 Id. at *71.
75 Id.
71Id. at *59-*60.
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only by copyrights but by trademarks as well. 17 The two types of
intellectual property exist concurrently.
However, after the copyright on an item expires, the owner may not be
able to register the same item as a mark. Not long after TrajFix, the
Supreme Court decided this issue. 78 In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., Twentieth Century Fox (Fox) retained Time, Inc. (Time) to
produce a television series called Crusade in Europe. 79 Time assigned the
copyright in the series back to Fox, but Fox failed to renew it.80 As a result,
the television series became part of the public domain in 1977.81 Dastar
purchased eight beta cam tapes of the original version of the Crusade in
Europe, copied them, and edited the series into a shorter version. 82 It then
released a video set called World War II Campaigns in Europe in 1995.83 It
had new footage, a new title sequence, and chapter heading sequences.84
However, Dastar's video failed to credit Fox or any other related parties.
Instead, it only credited its employees who produced the video. 86 Fox
claimed that "Dastar's sale of Campaigns 'without proper credit' to the
Crusade television series constitutes 'reverse passing off"87 which would
be in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.88 Basically, it alleged that
Dastar had confused consumers by falsely designating the origin of Crusade
-89in Europe.
However, the Court rejected this claim, reasoning that § 43(a) could
not be the basis of a claim by a former copyright owner that its
uncopyrighted work was copied, edited, or not credited properly.90 The
Court held that, once copyright on an item expires, the monopoly on the
item ends and it goes into the public domain. Thus Dastar was then free to
copy the series and became the origin of its own video set.9 '
7 Joseph Menn, Whose Mouse Is It Anyway?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com /2008/aug/22/business/fi-mickey22.
78 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
7 Id. at 25-26.
s Id. at 26.
81Id.
82 Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 26.
84 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26-27.
81 Id. at 27.
86 id.
87 "'Reverse passing off,' as its name implies, is . . . [t]he producer misrepresents
someone else's goods or services as his own." Id. at 27 n. 1.
8 8 Id. at 27.
89 See id. at 27-28.
90 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
9' Id at 33-34.
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The Dastar case did caution against creation of perpetual copyrights: 9 2
"Federal trademark law 'has no necessary relation to invention
or discovery,' but rather, by preventing competitors from
copying 'a source-identifying mark,' 'reduces the customer's
costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' and 'helps
assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product."' 93
In sum, it is clear that federal courts are cautious about the movement
from patents and copyrights to trademarks. They keep competition policy in
mind. They note that the function of trademarks is product differentiation,
and that marks should never be used to put competitors to a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage. However, it could be expected that
companies are trying to circumvent these holdings. Furthermore, trademark
registration is only one part of the whole story. Once a mark is registered,
its owner may have the incentive to enforce it vigorously as if it were a
patent or copyright. This article is going to discuss that practice in Part TV
B. With this trend, it is difficult for trademarks to actually be construed
narrowly to achieve their narrow economic function.
C. From Nontraditional Trademarks to Brands: Expanding the Scope
of Rights
As the scope of trademarks and especially nontraditional trademarks is
broadening, more items which traditionally might only be considered as
parts of brands, like three-dimensional packaging, sounds, scents and
colors, can receive trademark protections. The more brands are tied into
trademarks, the more they get a kind of legal protection that enhances their
foreclosure capacity, which could be quite harmful to competition. It could
potentially help a company to obtain the power to raise price and exclude
competitors.
Moreover, as two scholars have discovered, both trademark and
antitrust law "are giving corporate mark holders broad and increasing
competitive brand power without either an explicit public policy debate or a
conscious attempt to craft an appropriate legal regime to manage brands." 9 4
This is dangerous. In fact, trademarks and brands always play a hidden yet
important role in antitrust law and competition analysis. For example, what
92 Id. at 37.
9 Id at 34 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64).
94 Desai & Waller, supra note 12, at 1498.
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is "Microsoft Windows?" Both "Microsoft" and "Windows" are registered
trademarks of the Microsoft Corporation. Additionally, they are both
famous brands owned by the company. Apple, Google, Amazon and
Monsanto are all trademarks. They may have the ability to control a market
because they have a high level of consumer recognition and loyalty. These
names may differentiate them from other competitors. These names may
have the power to deprive competitors of certain important resources if not
excluding them entirely, which may well exceed the limits of the federal
mark registrations. These are just names, while there could be much more
as the scope of trademarks and brands expands. Competition law should
watch closely for any of the anticompetitive effects they may cause.
IV. COMPETITION ISSUES IN CURRENT TRADEMARK LAW
A. Trademarks and (Unfair) Competition in Theory
The Lanham Act, which is the federal trademark law, shows
Congress's efforts to further trademarks' source-identifying function while
not creating unreasonable (i.e., not reputation related) burdens on
competitors. The Supreme Court seems to be cautious on the issue of the
expansion of trademarks. It decided 5 trademark cases in the first 6 years of
the twenty-first century conveying its disapproval with "the expansive view
of trademark protection put forth by many lower courts" and that this
"stem[s] from the Court's conviction that trademark law remains an
offshoot of unfair competition rather than a subset of intellectual property
law."95 The Court has also expressed its concerns on the anticompetitive
effects the expansion of trademark rights might have. 9 6 This paper will now
discuss in turn both trademark registration and enforcement practices as
well as competition policy within them.
95 Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of
Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REv. 427, 427 n. 4 (2010) (citing David
S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM.
MrfCHELL L. REv. 1659, 1660 (2004)). These five cases are: Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205;
Tra/Fix, 532 U.S. at 23; Dastar, 539 U.S. at 23; Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418 (2003) (limited by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312,
120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c))); and KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004). The "unfair competition"
language here addresses the problem that sometimes a competitor may not comply with the
rules of the market and uses illegitimate means to compete, whereas antitrust laws address
another competition concern, protection of competition (sometimes competitors may also
receive protection, but not always).
96 See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169 (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S.
844, 850 n. 10 (1982)).
50o Vol. IX
COORDINATING EXTENSIVE TRADEMARK RIGHTS
a. Trademark Registration
Under the Lanham Act, in order to receive federal registration, a mark
should be (1) used or intended to use in interstate commerce, 97 (2)
distinctive,9 8 and (3) not otherwise barred by § 2 of the Act.99 Each of these
requirements shows some concerns on its impact on the market and
competition.
First, a trademark must be used or intended to be used in commerce.' 00
This shows the fact that trademark protection derives from the Commerce
Clause. A company can hold a patent without using it and preclude its
competitors from using it, but this foreclosure effect is not tolerable in
trademark law. The Seventh Circuit made it clear that a mark could not give
its owner an absolute monopoly.'l "By insisting that firms use marks to
obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs from reserving brand
names in order to make their rivals' marketing more costly."'1
02
Second, to receive federal registration, a mark must be distinctive. A
mark must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from those of
others. 103 Classified by increasing distinctiveness, classically trademarks
may be (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5)
fanciful. 104 A suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful mark will be inherently
distinctive and its owner will not need to further prove distinctiveness in
order to receive registration. 105 On the other hand, generic marks will
generally be denied registration because of the lack of distinctiveness.106
With respect to descriptive marks, it is now well settled that they may
acquire distinctiveness allowing them to be protected under the Lanham
Act. 107 The acquired distinctiveness is generally called "secondary
meaning." 108 That is, the public views its primary significance as
9 SHUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 463 (2007).
98 id
9 Id. Most notably, a trademark shall not be functional. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5)
(2006).
'oo 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
1o1 Ctr. Mfg., Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir. 2007).
102 Id. (quoting Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992))
(emphasis added).
103 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 97, at 484.
10 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
o0 See id.
106 id
07 See id. at 10.
los Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). See also Li, supra
note 8, at 441.
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identifying the source rather than the product itself. 109 Most of the
nontraditional trademarks, like the green-gold color in Qualitex, no fall
within the category of descriptive marks.
The distinctiveness requirement indicates the primary function of
trademark protection: identifying and distinguishing the source of product.
Ideally, the distinctiveness of a mark can help its owner more efficiently
compete with other market participants by attracting and creating
preferences in certain consumers.' However, this is not always the case.
Almost every farmer knows John Deere tractors' signature green color,"l 2
but does it actually add anything to help them identify a John Deere tractor
and distinguish it from a yellow Caterpillar tractor" 3 if the black words
"JOHN DEERE" are large and bold? As the Supreme Court mentioned in
Qualitex, colors are in unlimited supply,"l 4 and one can always pick up one
to use in commerce. But if the dominance over one mark can effectively
secure consumer recognition, do those companies need those many other
marks? For example, do many consumers know Coca-Cola's glass bottle is
different from any other beverage producers' bottles and these producers
are prohibited from using an identical bottle?' '5 If not, does it really make
sense to allow this foreclosure effect? What if this foreclosure also raises
Coca-Cola's rivals' costs? These questions can only be answered in
connection with the next paragraph.
Third, to receive registration a trademark shall not be otherwise barred
by the Lanham Act. The mark cannot be in violation of § 2 of the Act. Most
importantly, a trademark can never be functional. "16 Justice Breyer in
Qualitex clarified the utilitarian functionality standard:
The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use of a
product's feature as a trademark where doing so will put a
competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is
"essential to the use or purpose of the article" or "affects [its]
cost or quality." The functionality doctrine thus protects
1o9 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2001).
See also Li, supra note 8, at 441.
110 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159,163-64 (1995).
CHAMBERLIN, supra note 32, at 60. Will need to check out substance because
although earlier cite included his pages, this associate said he could not find the book.
112 See, e.g., DEERE & CO., Registration No. 3,132,124.
113 "Caterpillar Yellow" is a trade dress owned by Caterpillar. Cat Products: Legal
Notices, CAT.coM http://www.cat.com/cdalayout?m=37321&x=7. One can easily find this
special yellow color on Caterpillar's official website.
114 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166-68.
.. COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0,696,147. See also Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
116 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006).
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competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or
reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose,
namely their inability reasonably to replicate important non-
reputation-related product features." 7
The Court has set a really low standard. Back to the tractor example,
the use of John Deere green is not essential to the production of tractors.
And there is no evidence that the John Deere green paint would be
significantly less costly than other colors, or green tractors are of better
quality than others. So it is easy to prove that the John Deere green is not
functional and thus trademarkable." 8
The Coke bottle can also meet this test. A bottle is of course essential
to the production of bottled beverages. But "the" bottle is not, and Coca-
Cola's competitors are free to design their own bottles. Also, there is no
evidence that Coca-Cola has the most cost effective glass bottle or the
bottle is of better quality. However, although the bottle is not functional in a
legal sense, it is arguably functional in common sense, for it functions as a
container. As one could imagine, the application of the registration rules (in
light of competition policy) can be very complicated in the real world. We
discuss a famous case in the fashion industry in the following case law
section.
b. Trademark Enforcement
No corporation would like to share Xerox's fate: its mark "Xerox,"
though arbitrary or even fanciful at the very beginning, became generic and
thus invalid. '19 Although they potentially could have their marks
perpetually, mark owners have the responsibility to police their rights, or
they may otherwise lose their marks.120 The main causes of action available
to mark owners are trademark infringement and trademark dilution.
Section 43 of the Lanham Act forbids false designation of origin, false
description and dilution. 121 Under this section, mark owners can seek to
enjoin unauthorized uses of their marks. Traditional trademark infringement
"' Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169 (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850
n.10 (1982)) (emphasis added).
11 Color is not always an easy case. The colors used in the fashion industry can be
aesthetically functional. This article is going to discuss aesthetic functionality doctrine in the
subsequent case law section. See infra Part IV (B)(a).
l9 Ronald R. Butters, A Linguistic Look at Trademark Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 507, 512-13 (2007-2008).
120 15 U.S.C. § I 125(B)(2006). On the other hand, patents and copyrights cannot
become generic and enter public domain earlier than the end of their terms simply because
the owners fail to go after some infringers.
121 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(2006).
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doctrine has been codified in subsection (a). 122 The burden on a mark owner
suing for trademark infringement under § 43(a) is: to prove the likelihood
of consumer confusion.123
In the trademark infringement context, even if there is likelihood of
confusion, concurrent mark users are still able to assert several defenses.
These defenses are carefully drafted to condition mark owners' right to
exclude, to preserve market competition and to facilitate interstate
commerce. And many of them are analogous to the defenses raised in patent
and/or copyright infringement cases. This leads me to introduce an
important defense that has embedded genuine competition considerations
(although not widely recognized): trademark misuse, in the coming case
124law section.
Scholars have challenged the consumer confusion rationale behind
infringement actions, arguing that "the real injury caused by concurrent
uses of a mark was not consumer confusion but 'the gradual whittling away
or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or
name by its use upon non-competing goods."'l 2 5 Under the dilution theory,
a "likelihood of dilution" to the distinctiveness of the mark rather than a
"likelihood of confusion" of end purchasers is required to strike down the
unauthorized use of the mark. 126 Congress enacted the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995, and amended it in 2006. This statute has
been codified in § 43(c) of the Lanham Act.12 7 Generally, after the owner's
mark has become famous,12 8 he can enjoin any use of a mark or trade name
122 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). Please note, a mark owner can also bring a lawsuit
against an infringer under § 32 of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). It is a more
classic and narrower cause of action. However, they have the same set of factors for
trademark infringement lawsuits. The KP Permanent case discussed later was brought under
§ 32, but this fact does not affect any part of our analysis on trademark infringement,
likelihood of confusion, or fair use defense.
123 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 98, at 513-14. Infringement actions can also be brought
under § 32(1). Supra note 97.
124 Apart from these two, modem trademark law also recognizes the "first sale
doctrine." The purchaser of a trademarked and/or branded product or service can resell it
without infringing the mark. See generally GHOSH ET AL., supra note 98, at 558-566. In other
words, the limited quasi-monopoly exhausts upon the sale in commerce made by the mark
owner and cannot live on to the second generation. See above.
125 Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REv. 949, 951 (2001) (quoting Schechter, supra note 6, at
825).
126 Id. at 951-52 (emphasis added).
127 Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127).
128 "[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner."
15 U.S.C. §l 125(c)(2)(A) (2006). To decide whether a mark has the requisite degree of
recognition, the court may adopt a case-by-case analysis. The following factors may be
considered: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the
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in commerce "that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition 129 This cause of action
potentially can be very harmful to market competition, as the next section
will discuss. It will surely draw more attention and debate as more large
companies bring dilution claims to defend their famous marks.
B. Difficulties in Reality: The Interaction between Trademark Rights
and Competition Policies
The trademark enforcement theories are already not easy. When it
comes to real life practice, the complexity may be well beyond common
expectations, which in part explains the need for a more coherent regulatory
framework.
a. The Louboutin Mystery: Aesthetic Functionality in the Fashion
Industry
The federal courts in New York recently decided a heated issue in the
fashion industry: whether a single color can become a trademark (to put it
in another way, whether a single color is necessarily aesthetically functional
and therefore cannot be trademarked). Christian Louboutin designed his
signature high fashion women's shoes with "glossy vivid red" soles
sometime around 1992.130 Those shoes have won him great success and the
red sole received federal trademark registration in the year of 2008.131
Introduce defendant Yves Saint Laurent (YSL). Four models of YSL's 2011
collection - the Tribute, Trib Too, 132 Palais and Woostock - could have "a
bright red outsole as part of a monochromatic design in which the shoe is
entirely red."' 33 Christian Louboutin sued YSL for, among other claims,
trademark infringement and dilution and asked for a preliminary injunction
preventing YSL from marketing during the pendency of the suit any shoes
using the same or similar red. 134 The district court refused to do so, for "in
the fashion industry color serves ornamental and aesthetic functions vital to
mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties; (ii) The amount,
volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (iii) The
extent of actual recognition of the mark; and (iv) Whether the mark was registered under the
Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. Id.
29 15 U.S.C. §l125(c) (2006).
130 Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
'"' Id. at 448.
132 Id. at 449. The court used the word "Tribtoo" while the real name of the model is
"Trib Too."
13id.
134id
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robust competition" and therefore the court found that "Louboutin is
unlikely to be able to prove that its red outsole brand 135 is entitled to
trademark protection, even if it has gained enough public recognition in the
market to have acquired secondary meaning."136 According to the district
court, "functionality" in the fashion industry is to be determined by an
inquiry into whether the mark "serves ornamental and aesthetic functions
vital to robust competition." It is basically the same standard as "essential to
use or purpose."' 3 7And the district court found aesthetic functionality in the
red sole.
138
135 Id. Notice here, the court failed to distinguish brands from trademarks.
136
137 Id, at 450.
138 This picture shows the design of Christian Louboutin's Bianca women's pumps in
black and in the "glossy vivid red." See Christian Louboutin,
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/.
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As Qualitex illustrates, color marks can be functional and thus have
anticompetitive effects: "[I]f a design's 'aesthetic value' lies in its ability to
'confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use
of alternative designs,' then the design is 'functional."'l
4 0
The Qualitex Court went on to declare the upshot of aesthetic
functionality:
[W]here a color serves a significant nontrademark function -
whether to distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or
to satisfy the "noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty
to common and necessary things," - courts will examine
whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a
group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related)
competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an
important product ingredient. That examination should not
discourage firms from creating aesthetically pleasing mark
designs, for it is open to their competitors to do the same. 1
139 This picture shows the design of YSL Trib Too women's pumps in red and in
black. See YSL Official Site, http://www.ysl.com/us.
140 Qualitex Co. v. Jaconson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. c (1993)).
141 Id. (quoting in part G. CHESTERTON, SIMPLICITY AND TOLSTOY 61 (1912)).
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The Seventh Circuit once said: "[g]ranting a producer the exclusive
use of a basic element of design (shape, material, color and so forth)
impoverishes other designers' palettes. . . . [T]he more rudimentary and
general the element . . . the more likely it is that restricting its use will
significantly impair competition." 142 In other words, there should be a
balance between confusion and dominance. If there is no consumer
confusion, the mark owner should give the color back to others' palettes.
On September 5, 2012, the Second Circuit finally made its choice after
eight months' careful consideration.14 3 The opinion struck the right point. It
sided with Louboutin because it rejected the lower court's broad holding
that a single color may never serve as a legally protected trademark in the
fashion industry.144 Instead, it held that the red sole mark has acquired
secondary meaning and thus is valid as long as it is limited to the uses in
which the "red outsole contrasts with the remainder of the shoe (known as
'upper')." 145 At the same time, it sided with YSL because its
monochromatic design is not a use of the modified red sole mark and
therefore is legitimate. The court recognized Louboutin's trademark rights,
but also wanted to reduce false positives and preserve market competition
by affirming the district court's order rejecting Louboutin's motion to
enjoin YSL from marketing its monochrome red shoes.
The Second Circuit also clarified the standard of aesthetic
142 Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010).
143 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206 (2d Cir. 2012). Louboutin's request may be just a beginning of the Second Circuit's
headache. The United States District Court for Southern District of New York just issued
another opinion on May 21, 2012 reaching an opposite conclusion. See Gucci Am.. Inc. v.
Guess?, Inc.,868 F. Supp. 2d 207 (2012). It found that Guess has copied several trademarked
designs for clothing and accessories made by Gucci and ordered Guess to pay Gucci $4.66
million in damages. Don Jeffery, Guess? Copied Gucci Logo On Clothes, Accessories, Judge
Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, (May 21, 2012, 4:26 PM). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
05-21/guess-copied-gucci-logo-on-clothes-accessories-judge-says-1-.html. Notably, Guess'
lawyer emphasized in his closing argument that "[Gucci has] no evidence of actual
confusion and they have no lost sales or diverted sales." Id. The parties finally settled the
case. Trademark rights have prevailed over the freedom of design. However, this may not
bring peace and there will probably be another designer after YSL and Guess subject to
similar lawsuits and the Second Circuit may have to speak again.
144 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 212.
145 Id. The PTO later proposed a modification to the mark as a red sole "that contrasts
with the color of the adjoining remaining portion of the shoe (known as the 'upper')."
Louboutin opposed this modification and proposed its own amendment, arguing that the
PTO's language would unnecessarily limit its trademark protection. YSL supported the
PTO's new language. The PTO rejected Louboutin's amendment on January 16, 2013. Ryan
Davis, USPTO Rebuffs Louboutin Bid to Broaden Red Sole Mark, LAw360 (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/408586/uspto-rebuffs-louboutin-bid-to-broaden-red-sole-
mark.
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functionality. First, if the mark is (1) essential to the use or purpose of the
article, or if it (2) affects the cost or quality of the article, the mark is
functional and there is no need to go further. 146 Second, and more
importantly, when "the aesthetic design of a product is itself the mark for
which protection is sought, a court may still deem the mark functional if
giving the markholder the right to use it exclusively 'would put competitors
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage."' 1 4 7 To put it another
way, a mark can never undermine competitors' ability to compete in the
relevant market.' 48 The second part of the test embraces strong competition
policy considerations. From the perspective of trademark law, Louboutin
and all the markholders in the fashion industry won, because the court left
the door open for source-identifying colors to receive trademark
protections. From the perspective of competition policy, YSL and
consumers did not lose, because the validity of the red sole mark will not
preclude YSL's monochromatic shoes from competing in the women's
luxury heels market and consumers can still choose freely between
Louboutin's shoes and YSL's shoes.
Meanwhile, there are a few more interesting observations. First,
Louboutin's monochromatic red shoes are left outside the trademark
protection. But it does not seem likely that Louboutin would be
disadvantaged because of the reasons advanced by the Second Circuit.
Second, although courts have the power to invalidate or modify a
trademark,14 9 it should be the job of the PTO at the very beginning. If the
examining attorneys can keep competition policies in mind and carefully
craft the scope of marks, it may save the judges a lot of time.s 0 Third, the
court did not emphasize the trademarks' function to facilitate commerce and
its difference from other intellectual property rights. Louboutin's appellate
brief stated that trademarks are used, among other things, to reward
146 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 220. This is the traditional utilitarian functionality test.
14 7 Id. at 219-20.
148 Id at 220.
14 9 Id at 217, 228.
150 It is recognized that the PTO is understaffed and overwhelmed. Jake Meyer, Patent
Law Reforms Could Lead to More Money for the Patent Office, Better Patents, ON THE
EDGES OF SCIENCE AND LAW (Apr. 24, 2009), http://blogs.kentlaw.edu/islat/2009/04/patent-
law-reforms-could-lead-to-more-money-for-the-patent-office-better-patents.html.
Considering the caseload each examiner faces, this proposal may not be highly practical.
However, as the PTO has been increasing the number of patent examiners, it could also try
to increase the number of trademark examiners. Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An
Empirical Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10 (2012),
available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/tu-luckunluckofthedraw.pdf Although the PTO's
limited budget may not permit it to provide competition policy training to its examiners,
allowing them more time on each case by hiring more examiners seems relatively more
feasible, which may enable them to make more deliberated decisions.
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innovation,151 which is wrong and misleading. This misunderstanding may
lead to more improper enforcement efforts, exclusionary conduct, and
foreclosure effects.
A federal district court in California recently addressed a similar issue
in November 2012. It denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
in a trademark infringement claim. 152 In Paramount Farms International
LLC v. Keenan Farms Inc., Paramount alleged that Keenan infringed its
trade dress, a bin consisting of "(1) the prominent use of a unique bright
green color; (2) the thin, sans serif font for the word 'pistachios', which is
displayed in all capital letters; (3) the vertical orientation of the word
pistachios, which is written from bottom to top; (4) use of the color black,
as trim or otherwise, drawing contrast to the unique bright green color; (5)
images of pistachios."1 53 Keenan moved for summary judgment, claiming,
among other things, that the trade dress is functional.
Defendant's Bin (201)
Plaintiffs Bin (2007)
154
The court correctly pointed out that although each individual element
of the mark might be generic (and thus not trademarkable), a combination
151 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 220. This is the traditional utilitarian functionality test.
152 Gregory Gabriel, When Trade Dress Laws Extend Too Far, LAW360.Com (Jan. 2,
2013 12:39 PM), available at http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/401590/when-trade-dress-
laws-extend-too-far.
153 Paramount Farms Int'l LLC et al. v. Keenan Farms Inc. et al. 2012 WL 5974169, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
154 id.
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of them might be unique and entitled to trademark protection. 5 5 It is similar
to the Louboutin mark, where the unique red itself may not be
trademarkable, but the red outsole that contrasts with the remainder of the
shoe is. In the fashion industry, it is important for each top-end designer
brand to have its own distinctive style (including color), and a special
design of outsole may be seen more as an identification of the designer, but
less as a functional feature. A competitor may not be competitively
disadvantaged if it cannot adopt a truly distinctive and not overbroad
feature of the shoe. Instead, it will be disadvantaged if it cannot come up
with its own distinctive design.
However, this case is weaker. In the food industry, the quality of the
product is much more important than the design of the container. A bin that
is a combination of highly generic elements may be seen more as a
functional feature (to hold pistachios), but less as an identification of
source. It will certainly put competitors to a great non-reputation-related
competitive disadvantage and raise their costs if they can no longer use an
ordinary bin and have to switch to something else. The court may also be
wrong in refusing to grant summary judgment on the issue of inherent
distinctiveness since, as discussed before, most nontraditional marks are
descriptive and not inherently distinctive, 156 and it is not difficult to
conclude that this ordinary bin is not fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive.
Although Keenan may still prevail at trial, it would be time-consuming and
costly. Whether they win or lose, this trademark enforcement action has
already raised their costs and may affect market competition. The court has
failed to act as a gatekeeper. It should not permit companies to use
trademark laws to harm market competition.
As the Louboutin case shows, a trademark case may concern the
special features of a particular market, the procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects brought by the use or enforcement of the mark to
exclude others, and/or the distinctiveness or even uniqueness of the mark.
They are well beyond the traditional issue of consumer confusion, and
trademark law alone may not provide an adequate solution. Antitrust law.
and competition policies can potentially help solve a lot of problems.157
When a company's use and/or enforcement of its mark(s) is not for the
purpose of avoiding consumer confusion, nor is it based on the new dilution
' Id. at *5.
156 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
157 Here, however, YSL's counterclaims only concerns the validity of the red sole
mark and common law business torts. Christian Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent
America Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449. So the courts will have to wait for another
chance to speak on the antitrust issues surrounding trademarks.
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doctrine,' 5 such conduct should be deemed as normal branding strategies in
the stream of commerce which would receive similar antitrust scrutiny
despite the existence of the mark(s). Louboutmi's mark is still valid but its
vigorous enforcement efforts went beyond the scope of its trademark rights
in a way appearing to be anticompetitive.' 59
The use of competition policy derived from antitrust law will help in
the construction of trademark rights. 160 The analysis should always start
with consumers. Are they confused by similar goods? Do they benefit from
the mark at issue, which designates superior product source? Or are they in
fact harmed because their choices are limited as one seller tries to exclude
another from the market based on alleged violations of trademark law? A
mark should never put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage, or more broadly, undermine the competitor's ability to
compete in the market. The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have set
strong and consistent precedents to that effect. Trademarks may be
innovative but they have nothing to do with the promotion of innovation.
They are rooted in the Commerce Clause, and designed to facilitate
commerce, preserve market competition, and protect consumers. Courts
should always balance, with trademarks on one hand, and competition
policy on the other. Mistakes are unavoidable. An important policy
consideration will then be the choice between avoiding false positive and
avoiding false negative. In the Louboutin case, a false positive (the court
wrongfully sides with Louboutin) can potentially render substantial
foreclosure effects because a reputable competitor's several product lines
would be driven out of the market. On the other hand, a false negative (the
court wrongfully sides with YSL) might not be that dangerous. Louboutin's
shoes are still perceived as beautiful and of high quality. They still enjoy
great reputation, consumer recognition and loyalty, and thus have a very
good chance to succeed in the marketplace.
' See infra Part IV(A)(b)(ii). Whether the dilution doctrine is consistent with
trademark law is still under debate and many scholars are arguing that it goes too far from
the original idea of trademark protection. There could be dilution cause of action in this case
and Louboutin actually raised it. But the discussion of dilution will be saved for later
sections of this article.
159 A potential hurdle against challenging these assertion activities, however, would be
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which in general grants immunity to acts of petitioning in
court. E. R. R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 142 (1961).
60 For example, the reason why functional marks cannot receive registration is not
simply that the Lanham Act prohibits such registration. It should be because such
registration would affect significantly other competitors' ability to compete in the same
market. All courts and trademark practitioners should always keep the competition rationale
behind trademark law in mind.
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b. The Georgia-Pacific Scheme: When Marks Meet Tying
Trademark misuse is a familiar but not widely known term. It is
analogous to its much more heatedly debated cousin, patent misuse. Patent
misuse is an affirmative defense used in patent litigation when a defendant
has been accused of infringing a patent.'61 Similarly, trademark misuse is a
defense against meritless efforts to enforce trademark rights.162 One scholar
proposed an equitable definition of trademark misuse: a trademark holder's
(1) incorrect assertion of rights (2) with an improper purpose.16 3
There is very little case law on the issue of trademark misuse.
Although courts may mention this doctrine, they seldom decide cases on its
basis. The reason may be their correct but rigid recognition of the difference
between trademarks, and patents and copyrights, and the belief that
trademarks infrequently generate market power (which may no longer be
true). For example, one court, although acknowledging that courts might
deny enforcement of a trademark based on antitrust violations in the
exercise of its equity powers, observed "the forces favoring exercise of such
power in a trademark suit are much weaker than those calling for its
exercise in patent litigation." 6 4 It attributed the distinction to:
the fact that . .. [a] valid trademark . .. merely enables the owner
to bar others from use of the mark, as distinguished from
competitive manufacture and sale of identical goods bearing
another mark, or even no mark at all, since the purpose of
trademark enforcement is to avoid public confusion that might
result from imitation or similar unfair competitive practices
rather than to authorize restraints upon trade.' 6 5
However, this court's reluctance does not mean that there cannot be
any misuse of trademarks.
In Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products v. Von Drehlel66 and Georgia-
Pacific Consumer Products v. Myers Supply, 167 the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits faced suspicious "tying" conduct by Georgia-Pacific (G-P), a
leading designer and manufacturer of "paper products and dispensers for
161 See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
162 See id.
163 William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1566 (2006).
16 Carl Zeiss Stiflung, 298 F. Supp. at 1314.
65 Id.
166 Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441 (4th Cir. 2010).
167 Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2010).
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such products for the home and the away-from-home setting." 168 G-P
launched its enMotion-brand paper towel dispenser bearing several
enMotion trademarks in 2002. 169 It also manufactured a 10-inch-wide,
paper-towel roll for use in the enMotion dispenser.17 0 "The towels have no
trademarks printed on them."l 7 ' G-P did not sell the enMotions dispensers
but leased them to distributors, who in turn subleased the enMotion
dispensers to their end-user customers.17 2 Each distributor was supposed to
require sublessees to fill the dispenser with G-P towels.17 3 In addition, a
sticker and warranty card inside the dispensers stated that only Georgia-
Pacific towels shall be used. 174 G-P received a small payment from its
distributors and expected profits from its sale of the G-P towels.'77 In 2005
Von Drehle started selling to distributors a lower quality paper towel, 810-
B Towel, sized for use within G-P's enMotion dispensers. 176 In 2007,
Myers began selling the 810-B Towel manufactured by Von Drehle.1 77 G-P
claimed that both Von Drehle and Myers committed contributory trademark
infringement.78
The appellate courts reached different results. The Fourth Circuit
analogized G-P's new business model to a soda fountain labeled with the
Coca-Cola trademarks, which the end users would expect to dispense only
genuine Coca-Cola products. 179 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the
district court's conclusion that no reasonable jury would find a likelihood of
confusion. 180 The court held that confusion among the non-purchasing
168 Von Drehle, 618 F.3d at 444.
69 Myers Supply, 621 F.3d at 773.
7 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
17 4 id.
175 Id. The scheme adopted by G-P may enable it to set different leasing payments in
different geographic markets for its dispensers, which may result in price discrimination in
the dispenser market. In addition, the "tying" may harm the towels market for the obvious
exclusionary effects on generic towel makers.
6 Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441, 445 (4th Cir.
2010).
"7 Myers Supply, 621 F.3d at 773.
17 Von Drehle, 618 F.3d at 445. Von Drehle moved for summary judgment on all G-
P's claims and the district court granted. Myers Supply, 621 F.3d 771, 774. "After a bench
trial, the district court ruled for Myers on the contributory infringement claim, finding no
likelihood of confusion by consumers." Contributory trademark infringement exists, "if a
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement." Inwood Laboratories, 456 U.S. at 853-54.
179 Von Drehle, 618 F.3d at 446.
18 1 Id. at 455.
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public could be considered by a jury if it could "be shown that public
confusion will adversely affect the plaintiffs ability to control his reputation
among its laborers, lenders, investors, or other groups with whom plaintiff
interacts." If G-P cannot have the ability to keep up the high quality of
towels placed in the enMotions dispensers, it would face the risk of injury
to its enMotion trademarks. 18 2
In the Eight Circuit's case, the court focused much more on other
evidence. In addition to the enMotion dispensers, G-P manufactured
"universal" towel dispensers which also bore G-P trademarks. Besides, it
is "common practice in the industry, and not improper, to put one brand of
towels in an unleased, universal dispenser displaying a different
manufacturer's trademarks." 84 And G-P sold towels to be used in other
manufacturers' trademarked dispensers as well. 85 Thus, the Eight Circuit
did not find clear error in the district court's holding that there was no
likelihood of confusion.' 8 6
Notably, neither the majority opinion by the Fourth Circuit nor the one
by the Eighth Circuit addressed federal antitrust law issues. However,
probably many antitrust scholars will immediately connect G-P's business
plan with a tying arrangement. Also, the Fourth Circuit failed to give
enough consideration to competition policies. The tying-like scheme is
inherently suspicious. It interferes with the towels market and has no strong
justification in trademark law. The Coke soda fountain analogy is weak and
cannot justify the foreclosure. It may be true that once a consumer sees a
Coke soda fountain he or she will expect only sodas made by Coca-Cola
Company will come from the fountain, but does he or she have a similar
expectation on what comes from a towel dispenser? Does he or she really
care if the towels are G-P's high quality ones or merely some generic ones?
What he or she needs is simply to dry his or her hands. The most likely
situation is, even if the towels are of worse quality, the consumer will just
pull out more towels, and once his or her hands are dried he or she will be
equally happy no matter what towels he or she has used. If consumers with
adequate information still do not care at all, they are not confused and do
not need protection. Accordingly, there is no need for trademark law to take
any action.
A key fact of the case is that Von Drehle's towels were inferior to G-
P's towels, so there could theoretically be some harm to the G-P brand
"' See id. at 453.
182 id.
83 Myers Supply, 621 F.3d at 773.
84 Id.
85 id.
116 Id. at 779 or 777-79.
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and/or the enMotion trademarks, as well as consumers (though they may
not care). What if Von Drehle's towels are in fact better? But it is clear that
allowing better towels manufactured by G-P's competitors may (1) not
increase consumers' shopping cost, (2) encourage the production of quality
products, (3) facilitate competition on the merits, and (4) not encourage
manufacturers of inferior products to free ride. Both consumers and the
market are better off by better products and more vigorous competition on
the quality of products. Von Drehle would be better off by being able to
place its towels in G-P's dispensers and make more sales. And one cannot
say G-P is worse off simply because it has a strong competitor. In addition,
obviously, the "likelihood of confusion" theory is an ill fit in this
hypothetical because consumers likely do not care about confusion and they
are in fact better-off. Arguably, no trademark protection is necessary in this
situation. G-P's conduct may be an effort trying to exploit the market by
tying and excluding competitors. The so-called trademark protection or
enforcement here may merely be a means to the end of exploitation.
As the previous hypothetical has shown, in the broad context of
trademark infringement, the idea of "likelihood of confusion" may not be
quite compatible with facilitating competition and commerce. "Reasonable
interchangeability" is used to determine the relevant market. It is arguable
that when two products are reasonably interchangeable, it may be likely that
they will cause consumer confusion as to the sources of products.
Preventing likelihood of confusion may also lead to exclusion of
competitors in the market and eventually a more concentrated market. Does
the market need some weapons to police such exclusionary effects? The
answer is undoubtedly yes, and the cooperation of trademark law and
competition policy is once again needed. Competition policy and consumer
protection need to play a vital role in shaping the scope of the right to
exclude. It is generally better to have vigorous market competition and
more competitors. As long as a competitor will not confuse consumers with
inferior goods bearing similar marks, it should be allowed to stay in the
market. When consumers care about confusion but there is no likelihood of
confusion, the competitor should not be excluded. For example, YSL can
still introduce all-red women's shoes and compete with Louboutin. When
consumers do not care whether they would get confused (and therefore they
do not get confused), the competitor should also stay in the market. And
thus Von Drehle should have been able to compete with G-P.
Another issue concerning this case is whether there is any potential
federal antitrust law violation. Von Drehle counterclaimed against G-P for
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act, alleging
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that G-P had engaged in illegal tying arrangements.' 8 7 Neither the Fourth
nor the Eighth Circuit mentioned federal antitrust law issues in their
majority opinions. But the answer could be "yes" as Judge Wilson observed
in his concurrence opinion in the Fourth Circuit G-P case:
The district court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary
judgment on the Clayton Act claim because "end users [were]
purchasing paper towels for the enMotion dispenser from von
Drehle," and consequently there was no "evidence of actual
coercion by the seller that forced the buyer to accept the tied
product." . . . It granted summary judgment on the Sherman Act
claim because "von Drehle has competed favorably with G[-]P
in the sale of paper towels for the enMotion dispenser" and could
show no injury. . . . But von Drehle did not cross-appeal on this
issue, and the matter will have to play out (if it is to lay out at
all) on another day and, perhaps, on a different stage.
What if Von Drehle clearly raised antitrust trademark misuse as its
defense? Unfortunately, it likely would have still lost. If Von Drehle could
succeed in defending the trademark infringement case by alleging G-P's
new business model was in violation of federal antitrust laws, then:
any antitrust violation in the distribution of such merchandise
would result in a forfeiture of the trademark with a consequent
unnecessary frustration of the policy underlying trademark
enforcement. An essential element of the antitrust misuse
defense in a trademark case is proof that the mark itself has been
the basic and fundamental vehicle required and used to
accomplish the violation.'89
What if Von Drehle raised federal antitrust counterclaims and did
cross-appeal? This article agrees with Judge Wilson that it might be a
different story and it is an important issue that needs to be resolved some
day. It makes sense to limit any defense to trademark infringement actions
to the mark itself. But it may not make any sense to grant the branding
18 Von Drehle, 618 F.3d at 458 (Wilson J., concurring).
188 Id.
189 Carl Zeiss Stiflung, 298 F. Supp. at 1315 (emphasis added). And this is not the case
in this case. The towels had no mark. The court must assume that the hand washer has an
expectation about the manufacturer of the towels as otherwise the hand washer would wipe
his hands on his pants rather than use the towels provided. Yet there may be still something
wrong. What might be in violation of the Sherman Act and/or the Clayton Act was the
potential "tying" scheme, but not the ownership of the trademarks.
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strategies and business plans of the mark owner immunity simply because
of the validity of the trademarks as part of them in some other contexts.1 90
Courts should bear in mind that trademarks are just normal creatures in
interstate commerce, and they should be used in a way that facilitates
commerce and efficient competition. Competition policy should work
together with trademark law to deal with the foreclosure effects, even if
they are not serious or extreme enough to give rise to antitrust claims. There
can always be improper trademark enforcement against competition policy
that courts should find invalid.
c. The Victoria's Secret's Secret: Dilution or Commerce
Trademark dilution is more controversial than infringement. If
consumers do not become confused and as a result can still distinguish
products, there should be no infringement. Yet there could still be dilution
if the mark is famous. So is it necessary to grant certain companies
additional rights against their competitors simply because their trademarks
are famous?
The Supreme Court once tried to narrow the dilution doctrine by
requiring plaintiffs in a dilution action to prove actual economic loss. In
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, the owners of the Victoria's Secret retail
chain and the "VICTORIA'S SECRET" trademark, sought to compel
Victor and Cathy Moseley to stop using the name "Victor's Little Secret"
for their single retail store in Kentucky, and claimed dilution in violation of
the FTDA. 191 The Supreme Court said that the purpose of FTDA is to
protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the mark's
distinctiveness or tarnish or disparage it, even absent a likelihood of
confusion.1 92 It is the mark's uniqueness, not consumers, that the trademark
dilution laws are protecting.193 The Court recognized the "VICTORIA'S
SECRET" mark was famous and valuable.194 However, it held, its owners
failed to provide sufficient objective proof of actual injury to the economic
value of a famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from
a subjective "likelihood of dilution" standard). 195 This decision is also
190 If Eastman Kodak could not extend its market power in high-volume photocopier
and micrographic equipment to the after-market, how could G-P extend its market power (if
there is any) in the dispenser market to the towels market simply because it has trademarks,
brands, and/or goodwill to protect? Aren't they essentially the same thing? See generally
Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
191 537 U.S. 418, 422-24 (2003).
192 Id. at 428-31.
' Id. at 429.
194 Id. at 432.
195 Id. at 434.
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consistent with the Court's cautious efforts to limit the expansion of
trademark rights.
However, Congress reacted quickly by amending the statute and
adding the unequivocal language "or of actual economic injury" in 2006,
only three years after the Moseley case.' 9 6 Now the owner of a famous mark
can bring a federal trademark dilution lawsuit "regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury." This amendment may give these owners more power to exclude
competitors and non-competitors.
The Court in Moseley reviewed in dicta the legislative history of the
FTDA and found that it was intended "to protect famous trademarks from
subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or
disparage it."' 9 7 Additionally, it was clearly not motivated by consumer
protection, since the mark holder can pursue the cause of action "regardless
of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion."1 98 These two ideas
may not be consistent. As this article has discussed, the distinctiveness
requirement for trademarks exists because customers need to identify and
distinguish the source of product by recognizing its trademark. In other
words, if there is no likelihood of confusion among consumers, a famous
trademark is still distinctive despite others' use of it.199 Senator Hatch's use
of "distinctiveness" 200 to support FTDA seems less like the
"distinctiveness" required for federal mark registration, yet it seems more
like Frank Schechter's use of "uniqueness." 201 Without the clear goal of
protecting consumers, trademark dilution actions may protect the
"uniqueness" that is more analogous to innovative "Writings and
Discoveries" 202 protected by patents and copyrights. Is it exactly what was
cautioned against by the Court in Qualitex that granting patent-like
trademark rights may confer "a monopoly . . . [that] could be obtained
without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended
196 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1) (2006).
11 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431; 141 Cong. Rec. 38559-38561 (1995).
98 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
199 One could still argue that the determination of a "famous" mark requires an
assessment of consumer recognition of the source of product. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(2)(A)
(2006). But it does not mean once you have received the required consumer recognition you
can exclude your competitors from any use of your famous mark. In contrast, the goal of
trademark protection only permits such exclusion when the competitors' use will be likely to
cause consumer confusion. If consumers do not get confused, there is no need to take actions
to protect them.
200 141 Cong. Rec. 38559-38561 (1995).
201 Schechter, supra note 7, at 831. He claimed that "the preservation of the
uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection . .
202 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Fall 2013 69
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL
forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity)."20 3
There are not many limitations in trademark law on the application of
the dilution doctrine. The three conditions specified by the statutes are: (1)
the mark has to be famous; 204 (2) there should be dilution by blurring or
tarnishment; and (3) the application is subject to principles of equity. 20 5 Fair
use of marks, noncommercial use of marks, and news reporting and news
commentary are not actionable. 2 06 These limitations seem relatively narrow
compared to the broad language "regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury."207
This problem raises the following question: is the amendment going
so far that it may give rise to some constitutional concerns? To answer this
question, first it is necessary to determine how to construe this statute. The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act is special interest legislation carefully
crafted to protect the distinctiveness of famous marks.2 0 8 It can be seen as
an exception to the general infringement rule requiring proof of likelihood
of confusion. Judge Easterbrook once stated that "[w]hen special interests
claim that they have obtained favors from Congress, a court should ask to
see the bill of sale. Special interest laws do not have 'spirits,' and it is
inappropriate to extend them to achieve more of the objective the lobbyists
wanted." 2 0 9 And "[t]he limitation is part of the price of the victory achieved,
a concession to opponents who might have been able to delay or block a bill
even slightly more favorable to the proponents." 2 '0 The special interest
legislation "enshrines results rather than principles."21 '
Admittedly, there are potential conflicts between the amended FTDA
and the goal of the Lanham Act, but they may be reconciled given the
principle that special interest legislation should be construed carefully,
strictly and narrowly. The statute defines "famous," "dilution by blurring,"
203 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65.
204 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1) (2006). It is true that in order to become famous, a mark
need to possess the general consumer recognition as source-identifying. However, as this
article has asked: when you buy a bottle of Coca-Cola, do you associate the word mark
"Coca-Cola" with the beverage itself or the Coca-Cola Company? If not only you, but
average consumers in the United States all associate the mark with the taste of the beverage
(i.e., the product itself), theoretically it is not famous. But in reality, clearly, the Coke mark
is famous. So is it fair to equip Coca-Cola with this dilution weapon here? Maybe not.
205 id
206 15 U.S.C. § I I25(c)(3) (2006).
207 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1) (2006).
208 141 Cong. Rec. 38559-38561 (1995).
209 Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. Nat'l Basketball Assoc., 961 F.2d 667,
671 (7th Cir. 1992).
211 id
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and "dilution by tarnishment." 2 12 Besides, Congress indicated unequivocally
in the definition of "famous" that the mark should function "as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner."2 13 It is
therefore not easy to argue that the statute is going too far considering the
limited special purpose of the statute. It is true that it may have
anticompetitive effects, but without actual foreclosure effects or other
unintended results, it may not be appropriate to speculate.
The dilution doctrine is at least controversial, if not
unconstitutional. 214 Antitrust and competition policy should inform the
interpretation of the scope of trademark entitlement including the new
protections against trademark dilution. There is a role for antitrust when the
exclusion or exploitation reaches some serious and significant level.
However, the primary concern is for trademarks to serve their historic and
economically important function with as little adverse side effect as
possible. As previously discussed, the monopolistic aspects of marks can be
tolerated because there are economies achieved through them. But the
economies will only be achieved if the use of marks is closely tied to the
limited function of product differentiation. Therefore, I advocate that proof
of a real threat of confusion or unfair competition, and some resulting
economic injury should be required. Otherwise, this part of trademark law
may obstruct competition and the free flow of commerce.
Conceivably, large companies would like to push Congress to provide
more protection for their businesses.2 15 The FTDA may remain as it is, but
competition policy should always be considered together with the clearly
212 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(2) (2006). A mark is famous if "it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark's owner." Dilution by blurring is "association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark." Dilution by tarnishment is "association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark." Id.
213 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(2006).
214 The Supreme Court's new healthcare holding may give this constitutional
challenge a few more teeth. According to Chief Justice Roberts, Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause by regulating inactivity in the healthcare insurance
market, i.e., forcing people to buy health insurance. Nat'l Fed' of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2622 (2012). Following the same logic, the trademark dilution doctrine may
not stand because if the defendant is not in the same geographic or product market as
plaintiff (in other words, the defendant does not have any activity in any of the markets
where the plaintiff plays, like Victor's Little Secret versus Victoria's Secret), Congress
cannot regulate this defendant's inactivity in the relevant market under its commerce power
either. The FTDA may cross the line if viewed under the Supreme Court's 2012 reading of
the Commerce Clause.
215 FTDA may in fact favor big companies more as they are more likely to have
famous trademarks.
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stated Congressional goal in the FTDA. If the FTDA is not amended or
repealed, courts need to keep in mind competition concerns and the narrow
purpose of the FTDA when deciding dilution cases, to avoid reaching bad
results that may contradict the goal of the Lanham Act or even the
Commerce Clause.
V. TOWARDS A MORE COHERENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
All traditional marks, nontraditional marks, as well as other branding
tools and strategies in the business world should subject to antitrust
scrutiny. Unless trademark law specifically grants them some immunity,
they should be considered together with competition policy. And any
immunity should be closely and narrowly tied to the original policy goals of
the Lanham Act: to protect consumers and facilitate interstate commerce.
With respect to trademarks, courts and administrative agencies should
pay close attention to two major areas: trademark registration and trademark
enforcement. First, the more rigorous the registration standard and the
evidentiary standard for infringement, the less harm trademarks (and the
idea of branding and goodwill behind them) would have on competition and
markets. The focus of the regulation should to some extent lean towards
avoiding false positives. To receive federal trademark registration, a mark
must be used or intended to be used in interstate commerce and must also
be distinctive and nonfunctional. An examiner should keep competition
policy in mind in the entire examination process. Trademark protection is
based on the Commerce Clause and a mark can only further the goal of
consumer protection and facilitate interstate commerce by actual use in
commerce. And even if a mark is valid, the foreclosure or exclusionary
effect it can exert on its owner's competitors should be limited only to
prevent consumers from confusing the source of the product bearing the
mark. A court should keep these in mind and should recognize that
sometimes marks may be wrongfully granted or overbroad and ownership
of trademarks can never be determinative in deciding competition issues.
A mark should also be distinctive and nonfunctional. A mark must
either be fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive (so that it can become inherently
distinctive), or acquire secondary meaning through its use in commerce (so
that it can acquire distinctiveness). The term "distinctiveness" shall be
evaluated in light of the purpose of helping consumers identify and
distinguish the source of the product, i.e., the manufacturer, in contrast to
the product itself.
One should analyze the requirement of distinctiveness together with
the requirement of nonfunctionality. A mark should not be technically or
aesthetically (however distinctive the mark may be) functional. A mark
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cannot excessively interfere with a competitor's ability to compete.216 The
(non)functionality doctrine is designed to protect competitors against a
disadvantage unrelated to recognition or reputation.2 17 This disadvantage is
the competitors' inability to reasonably replicate important non-reputation-
related product features.2 18 Courts and the PTO should not ignore this
important competition policy embodied in the nonfunctionality requirement
when deciding if the mark is functional. The foreclosure effects and
increasing costs may drive existing competitors out of the market and/or
build high entry barriers blocking potential new market participants, while a
healthy and robust market wants them to come and stay.
Reconciliation of competition policy and antitrust law is also
necessary in trademark enforcement actions. It is true that a mark owner has
the duty to police its trademark and such policing efforts require at least
some exclusionary conduct, but the scope of such exclusionary right should
be carefully shaped by competition policy. There are two major
enforcement actions: trademark infringement and trademark dilution. From
a competition law perspective, traditional infringement actions may impose
less danger since the key element that a plaintiff needs to prove is the
likelihood of consumer confusion. In other words, an infringement cause of
action is designed to protect consumers from being confused about the
product source, which is the original goal of the Lanham Act.
Competitors need defenses against infringement claims. The problem
with the potential trademark misuse defense is more unclear and complex.
Analogous to the patent misuse doctrine, trademark misuse can be
established only when the mark itself has been the "basic and fundamental
vehicle required and used to accomplish the [antitrust] violation." 2 19 It is
rarely the case as discussed above. However, it is not necessary to have a
trademark misuse defense. A practitioner may urge the court to consider
competition policy or even raise antitrust counterclaims. Once an
enforcement effort is not aimed to prevent any possible consumer
confusion, or to preserve the distinctiveness of the trademark at issue (i.e.,
not to protect the mark against dilution), it probably runs so far that it may
fall outside trademark protection. It therefore becomes an ordinary business
conduct like price discrimination or market allocation to be evaluated under
antitrust law.
For example, if no consumer cares about what brand of towels will
come out of a dispenser when trying to dry hands, G-P's carefully designed
216 Christian Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves Saint, 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
217 Qualitex v. Jacobson, 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
218 id.
219 Carl Zeiss Stifitung, 298 F. Supp. at 1315.
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business plan may simply be an ordinary price discrimination or tying
scheme. Once the trademark related conduct clearly falls outside the scope
of trademark protection, the fact of the ownership of a valid mark becomes
irrelevant. Defense lawyers may even try to bring antitrust counterclaims
and courts have to consider those counterclaims using the same or similar
level of scrutiny as the Ninth Circuit decided in the Eastman Kodak case.
Even if the conduct may not clearly exceed the scope of trademark rights, a
court should not simply assume a mark as a signal of a strong lawful right
to exclude, but should always balance the competition policy and trademark
protection.
The dilution doctrine is young and controversial. It offers a more
patent- and copyright-like protection to preserve the distinctiveness of a
famous mark. The mere fact that it is special interest legislation does not
mean there are serious constitutional problems with it. But it may not be
consistent with the goal of deterring false positives and may have
significant foreclosure effects. Taking the FTDA as it is, courts must keep
in mind all competition policy considerations and the narrow purpose of the
FTDA when deciding dilution cases. And if it turns out to be that courts fail
to do so, it would be better to take the FTDA out of the Lanham Act to have
a more coherent regulatory framework. For now, I advocate that a proof of
a real threat of confusion or unfair competition, and some resulting
economic injury should be required. Otherwise, this part of trademark law
may hinder competition and interstate commerce.
Improper acquisition or enforcement of trademarks could potentially
result in violations of several antitrust laws at least in theory. This includes
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which requires proof of two elements: (1)
concerted action, and (2) unreasonable restraint of trade. 22 0 G-P's tying
arrangements with its distributors may fall within this category. However,
as trademark-related branding and/or business strategies like these
agreements are often ancillary to a legitimate joint venture, courts are more
likely to adopt a rule of reason analysis and uphold the scheme unless it is
proved to be pretextual or the mark owner possesses market power.
Second, there could be potential violations of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.221 There are two possible causes of action under this section:
monopolization and attempted monopolization. 222 A claim for
monopolization is established when the defendant (1) possesses monopoly
power in the relevant market, and (2) willfully acquired or maintained that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
220 See 15 U.S.C. § 1(2004).
221 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
222 id.
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superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. For example, if
the leading manufacturer in a highly concentrated market brings a trade
dress infringement suit against one of its competitors that has launched a
similar competitive product after the expiration of the leading
manufacturer's utility patent on its own product, the defendant could try to
counterclaim for antitrust violations under section 2 of the Sherman Act
because the leading manufacturer arguably has market power and tried to
willfully maintain it. An attempted monopolization occurs when the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (1) a
specific intent to monopolize, and (2) a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power.224 The previous example would fall into this category if
the market is only moderately concentrated and the manufacturer is not yet
in the leading position. G-P's "tying" arrangements may constitute an
attempt to monopolize as well.
Additionally, as Von Drehle's counterclaims show, Section 3 of the
Clayton Act targets practices like tying and exclusive dealing.2 25 It requires
a complainant to prove (1) conditioned sale, and (2) a likelihood of
substantial lessening of competition. 226 The FTC may challenge such
practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act. 2 2 7 One final reminder: even
absent an antitrust violation, competition policy should always play an
important role in guiding trademark law to achieve its original goal of
product differentiation and source identification.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trademarks are important intellectual property rights. They do not
reward innovations or creativity, but seek to protect consumers from being
confused about product sources. Trademark protection is based on the
Commerce Clause, which is also the basis of the Sherman Act. Therefore
federal trademark law should work coherently with competition laws and
policies to facilitate interstate commerce and competition. However, as the
scope of trademarkable subject matter is expanding, as well as the current
efforts by corporations to seek trademark protection instead of or in
addition to patents and/or copyrights, trademarks start to raise competition
concerns as well.
There is no need to stop vigorous and creative trademark practice, but
both courts and administrative agencies (and even legislators) need to
223 id.
224 id.
225 15 U.S.C. § 14.
226 id.
227 15 U.S.C. § 45.
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understand the importance of trademarks in the business world and must
carefully police the use of them. This article argues that they should be
aware that traditional marks, nontraditional marks, as well as other branding
tools and strategies are normal creatures in the business world. They should
be considered in light of competition policy. Any enforcement efforts
should be closely analyzed in light of the original policy goals of the
Lanham Act: to protect consumers and facilitate interstate commerce.
Trademark law, competition policy and antitrust law are coherent
theoretically, and they should be coherent in reality. Re-visitation and
reconciliation of both trademark law and competition policy in detail are
important and necessary efforts towards a more coherent regulatory
framework to preserve competition and boost interstate commerce.
